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ABSTRACT 
The general determinants of socioeconomic and technological performance are of profound 
interest in social and political sciences to understand the historical developmental paths of 
nations. The vast literature has suggested several approaches to explain the differences of 
technological performances among nations, such as the varieties of capitalism’s theory of 
innovation argues that a dissimilar behaviour of political institutions is a principal driver of 
differences in national innovative behaviour. However, in the varieties of capitalism and other 
frameworks, the notion of state power and the relation between typologies of executive, 
technological and socioeconomic performances of countries are generally absent. The present 
study confronts these problem and endeavours of analyzing the nexus (relation) between 
leadership-oriented executives, technological and socioeconomic performances of nations. 
Results show that high levels of technological performance of nations seem to be associated 
to executive with parliamentary monarchy and monarchy (leadership-oriented government), 
whereas nations with mixed executive tend to have lower performances. A possible reason of 
these results is that, in general, some typologies of executive leadership-oriented (e.g., 
Monarchy) support the political stability of countries with subsequent fruitful socioeconomic 
developmental paths over the long run. In short, the study here shows the vital role of the 
structure of government in national systems of innovation and in particular how leadership-
oriented executives can support socioeconomic performances of countries. Overall, then, the 
structure of executives might be one of contributing factors to explain dissimilar patterns of 
technological innovation and economic growth of nations over time.  
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Varieties of Capitalism; Technological Performance; Leadership; Executive; Government; 
Technology; Socioeconomic Performance; Political Stability. 
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The relation between typologies of executive 
and technological performances of nations 
MARIO COCCIA  
1. INTRODUCTION
The general determinants of socioeconomic and technological performance of nations are of 
profound interest in social and political sciences to understand the historical developmental 
paths over time
1
. Many studies have analyzed several determinants of technical change and eco-
nomic growth, such as the democratization (Coccia, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2008), demographic 
change and population (Coccia, 2014), religion and culture (Guiso et al., 2003; Coccia, 2014a), 
energy systems (Coccia, 2010a, 2010b), climate (Smithers and Blay-Palmer, 2001; Coccia, 
2015a), new products (Calabrese et al., 2005; Cavallo et al., 2014; 2014a; 2015; Coccia, 2016)
2
, 
institutional evolution (Acemoglu et al., 2005), regulation of public action (Guenoun and Ti-
berghien, 2007), quality of local governance (Van Roosbroek and Van Dooren, 2010), political 
economy of R&D investments (Coccia, 2008, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012, 2010c, 2013; Coccia 
and Rolfo, 2000; Rolfo and Coccia, 2005), technology transfer (Coccia, 2004, 2010d; Coccia 
and Rolfo, 2002; Cariola and Coccia, 20004), radical innovation (Coccia, 2016; 2016a, 2016b) 
scientific collaboration (Coccia and Wang, 2016; Coccia and Bozeman, 2016); reforms of cen-
tral government (Adhikari et al., 2012), etc. In general, institutions play a vital role in national 
innovation systems because they are one of the main elements of the complex network of eco-
nomic agents that supports the process of technical advance in economy (Coccia, 2010). In par-
ticular, political institutions influence innovative activities by developing a set of laws, policies, 
norms, and infrastructures under which interactions between economic subjects, groups, and or-
ganizations take place for wealth creation and sustainability (cf., Olstrom, 1990; Edquist, 2005; 
Spencer et al., 2005). A theoretical framework linking national-level institutions to innovative 
activity differences across countries is the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach by Hall and 
Soskice (2001).  
The varieties of capitalism’s (VOC) theory of technological innovation claims that variance 
in political institutions is the principal determinant of differences in national innovative behav-
iour: “more a polity allows the market to structure its economic relationships, the more the poli-
ty will direct its inventive activity toward industries typified by ‘radical’ technological change. 
Conversely, the more a polity chooses to coordinate economic relationships via nonmarket 
mechanisms, the more it will direct its inventive activity toward ‘incremental’ technological 
change” (Taylor, 2004, p. 601). The state, the strengths of its authority and social power are im-
portant characteristics that influence economic systems, policy and relationships of economic 
subjects for fostering innovation and industries (Broberg et al., 2013). In general, the leadership 
is a feature that can improve the technological and socioeconomic performances of complex or-
1
 Coccia, 2005, 2007, 2008a, 2009, 2009d, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2015a; Wright, 2005; cf. also Spolaore and 
Wacziarg, 2013. 
2
 Cf. also Coccia 2009c, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2014b, 2015b, Coccia and Wang, 2015, Coccia et 
al., 2012. 
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ganizations (Zaccaro, 2007; Makri and Scandura, 2010; Ryan and Tipu, 2013). However, in the 
varieties of capitalism’s theory of technological innovation and in other theoretical frameworks, 
the concept and role of structure of executive, state power and leadership of government are 
generally absent (cf., Taylor, 2004; Broberg et al., 2013). Especially, in this research field, the 
relation between typologies of executive and technological performances of countries is hardly 
known. A main research question is how typologies of executive affect national level of innova-
tive activity. The problem underlying this research question is to explain the institutional deter-
minants of dissimilar technological and economic performance of countries. This study con-
fronts this problem and endeavours to integrate whenever possible, the varieties of capitalism 
framework by analyzing the relation between types of executive and technological-
socioeconomic performance of nations. In particular, this essay here has two goals. The first is 
to show that different patterns of technological innovations of nations may be also affected by 
dissimilar structures of executive. The second is to show that some typologies of executive can 
be more leadership-oriented, maintain political stability and support innovative activity of na-
tions. Before analyzing and clarifying this socioeconomic issue, next sections present the theo-
retical background and methodology of this study.  
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
In economics of technical change, questions about the institutional causes of differences in 
technological performances of nations have remained at the periphery of research fields (Taylor, 
2004). In this context, the varieties of capitalism’s (VOC) theory of technological innovation 
makes its foray to explain cross-national differences of technological performances and dissimi-
lar directions of technological progress among nations. VOC is a theory of capitalism in which: 
“some countries use markets more than others to coordinate economic actors and this variation 
is used to explain a myriad of comparative and international political-economic behaviour” 
(Taylor, 2004, p. 603).  
This theoretical framework argues that national institutions affect firms and other economic 
subjects by coordinating their socioeconomic activities. Countries in VOC theory can be either 
liberal market economies (LMEs), which are based on competitive market arrangements or co-
ordinating market economies (CMEs) that are based on non-market arrangements of collaborat-
ing networks of interacting firms/economic subjects (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The variation of 
coordinating mechanisms can influence patterns of innovation and economic activity of coun-
tries. In particular, economic subjects (firms, universities, public research organizations, etc.) 
operating within LMEs tend to produce more radical innovation, whereas economic subjects in 
CMEs tend to generate more incremental innovation (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Taylor, 2004; 
Broberg et al., 2013, pp. 2575ff). An alternative framework in this research field is by Spencer 
et al. (2005) that include the structure of the state and society:  
 
the structure of the state encompasses strong state structures where government authority is 
derived inherently from the state or weak state structures where government authority orig-
inates from the people. The structure of the society varies according to whether a country is 
organized along the interest of individuals (i.e., associational structures) or to the interests 
of groups of individuals (i.e., corporatists)-(Broberg et al.,2013, p. 257).  
 
Spencer et al. (2005) argue that different features of the structure of state and society gener-
ate four institutional types of nations: State corporatist, Social corporatist, Liberal pluralist and 
State nation. These theories have not been confirmed in empirical studies (Taylor, 2004; Brob-
erg et al., 2013). While the validity of certain of criticisms may be debated, it is clear that there 
are at least some facts about differences of technological performances of countries that these 
approaches have trouble explaining. The general consensus among scholars is that the varieties 
of capitalism’s theory of innovation and theory by Spencer et al. (2005) are in need of additional 
explanatory elements that better explain economic and innovation differences across countries 
(cf., Campbell and Pedersen, 2007; Broberg et al., 2013, pp. 2575ff). 
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A main variable, not included in these theoretical frameworks, is the leadership based on the 
structure of executive (Zaccaro, 2007; Avrey et al., 2006; cf., Klavans and Boyack, 2008).  As a 
matter of fact, the examination of the relation between leadership and innovation is basic since 
leader systems can positively influence innovation processes and innovative activities of eco-
nomic subjects (cf., Howell and Avolio, 1993). 
Leadership is defined in terms of: “ (a) influencing individuals to contribute to group goals 
and (b) coordinating the pursuit of those goals . . . . leadership as building a team and guiding it 
to victory” (Van Vugt et al., 2008, pp. 182-3). “Leadership is a solution to the problem of col-
lective effort –the problem of bringing people together and combining their efforts to promote 
success and survival” (Kaiser at al., 2008, p. 96). Some studies argue that the leadership is a 
universal feature of human societies, which affects the population and citizens in important 
ways (Van Vugt et al., 2008, p. 182; Bennis, 2007).  
In fact, “Leadership … has a long evolutionary history …. Arguably, individual fitness 
would be enhanced by living in groups with effective leadership (Van Vugt et al., 2008, p. 184). 
Leadership is also a system of relationships that involves the power in varying degrees in organ-
izations (cf., Hollander and Offermann, 1990).  
Galton defined leadership with two main features (as quoted by Zaccardo, 2007, pp. 6ff): 1) 
as a unique property of extraordinary individuals whose decisions are capable of sometimes rad-
ically changing the streams of history; 2) the unique attributes of such individuals in their inher-
ited or genetic makeup (see Zhang et al., 2009 for the genetic basis and gene-environment inter-
actions on leadership role). Arvey et al. (2006, pp. 2-4) claim that the leadership role occupancy 
is associated with genetic factors influencing the personality variables, such as social potency 
and achievement of specific goals. “Galton. . . argued that the personal qualities defining effec-
tive leadership were naturally endowed, passed from generation to generation” (Zaccaro, 2007, 
p. 6). The leadership is in general affected by the situational context (cf. Vroom and Jago, 2007, 
pp. 17ff) and social environment around economic subjects (Zhang et al., 2009). In fact, Porter 
and Mc Laughlin (2006, p. 559) state that: “leadership in organization does not take place in a 
vacuum. It takes place in organizational contexts”.  
Many studies argue that the leadership is one of the most important determinants for improv-
ing innovation and performance in organizations. Jung et al. (2003) show a positive linkage be-
tween style of leadership, called “transformational”, organizational innovation and innovation-
supporting organizational climate. Krause (2004) considers the leadership in terms of specific 
factors of influence (such as granting freedom and autonomy, openness of the decision-making 
process, etc.) for innovative behaviour of organizations.  
Other scholars, such as Makri and Scandura (2010, pp. 85-86), show that the leadership 
seems to be an important driver of firm’s ability to innovate. Carmeli et al. (2010) confirm that 
the leadership significantly enhances the performance of firms. In particular, transformational 
leadership tends to be a catalyst in enhancing organizational outcomes and innovation propensi-
ty (Ryan and Tipu, 2013, p. 2119; Gardner and Avolio, 1998; Howell and Avolio, 1993). In 
short, the examination of the leadership–innovation connection is important in advancing and 
developing country context in the presence of intense competition, institutional instability and 
macroeconomic volatility (Tybout, 2000).  
Although the vast literature in these topics, social studies lack of an integrative theoretical 
framework, which explains the relation between the leadership in the structure of executive and 
technological performances of countries.  
In fact, type of executive and dominant political class can play a main role for socioeconom-
ic performances of nations. Mosca (1933) showed that the politicians can be considered as lead-
er entrepreneurs and their activities are similar to political enterprises (cf., Schumpeter (1975 
[1942]). Weber (1919) argued that the essence of democracy consists of having charismatic 
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leaders, which can be able to contrast the powers of the bureaucracy, to affect political institu-
tions and support policy and economic outcomes (cf. also Persson and Tabellini, 2001) 
3
.  
In general, several studies show that political structures can affect, positively or negatively, 
economic development of nations (Radu, 2015; Coccia, 2010). Some important typologies of 
executive in the geopolitical structure of nations are as follows:  
 Monarchy is a form of executive in which a group, usually a family called the dynasty, 
embodies the country's national identity and one of its members, called the monarch, 
exercises a role of sovereignty. 
 Parliamentary monarchy is a state headed by a monarch who is not actively involved in 
policy formation or implementation but it has a main institutional role; governmental 
leadership (formally) is carried out by a cabinet and its head – such as a prime minister, 
premier, etc. - who are drawn from a legislature (parliament). 
 Mixed executive can be a parliamentary system of government: the executive branch of 
government has the direct or indirect support of the parliament (vote of confidence). 
Parliamentary systems usually have a head of government and a head of state. The head 
of government is the prime minister, who has the real power.  
 
This theoretical background shows that the national institutions, the structure of executive 
and associated leadership can play a vital role in economic and social activity of nations.  
This study here endeavours to integrate whenever possible, the theoretical frameworks of 
VOC and Spencer et al. (2005) by analyzing the relation between typologies of executive and 
innovative activities to explain the difference in technological and socioeconomic performances 
of countries.  
The following sections present methodology and results about this nexus (connection) to 
clarify, as far as possible, one of contributing factors that affects the socio-economic progress 
and dissimilar historical developmental paths of nations.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND WORKING HYPOTHESIS 
Suppose that:  
- A nation is a system that can produce the same outcome in different ways. 
- Monarchy and parliamentary monarchy are based on stronger authority and leader-
ship-oriented structure of executive. 
- Mixed executives are a type of government of nations not based on leadership-
oriented government and with lower social power. 
 
The focal hypothesis of this study is: 
 
Hypothesis α (HP α): Nations with leadership-oriented executives (Monarchy and Parlia-
mentary Monarchy) have higher technological and economic performances than Mixed execu-
tive (not leadership-oriented executive), ceteris paribus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 cf. Hernandez, 2008; Coccia (2001; 2008, 2009a, 2009b), Coccia and Cadario (2014), Coccia et al. 
(2015), Coccia and Rolfo (2007, 2010) for the relation between bureaucracy, organizational behaviour 
and performance of public organizations.  
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Figure 1. Linkages between leadership-oriented executive and high levels of technological and 
economic performances of nations  
 
 
The purpose of the present study is to see whether the statistical evidence supports this hy-
pothesis α that leadership-oriented executives are positively associated to higher technological 
and economic performances as represented in figure 1.  
The source of Data is the Democracy Time-series Dataset by Norris (2008). The sample is 
based on all countries present in this dataset (Norris, 2008). The period under study is over 
2010s. The study here considers the following classification of executive: parliamentary monar-
chy and monarchy that are assumed to be leadership-oriented executives, whereas mixed execu-
tive is supposed to be a not leadership-oriented executive
4
. In particular, Monarchy in the study 
here includes 13 countries; Parliamentary Monarchy includes 31 countries and Mixed executive 
includes 92 countries that for the sake of briefness, the list is not described in Appendix A. 
The socio-economic variables and related years under study are: 
- Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) annual by 
World Bank (2008). GDP is a measure of the economic activity. It is defined as the 
value of all goods and services produced minus the value of any goods or services 
used in their creation.  
- Human Development Index (HDI) 2002 year (UNDP, 2004). The HDI is a summary 
measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long 
and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI 
is based on three dimensions: The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at 
birth; the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults 
aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school enter-
ing age; the standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per 
capita. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a 
composite index using geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three 
dimensions (UNDP, 2016). 
- Kaufmann political stability 2006. It measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including political violence and terrorism (WGI, 2016; Thomas, 2010).  
- A main proxy of the technological potential of countries is the Energy consumption 
in Kilograms per capita and Electric power production (KWh) per capita.   
 
                                                     
4
 Other types of executive, such as Presidential Republic, are not considered because data are misleading.  
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The preliminary statistical analysis is performed with Arithmetic mean and Standard Devia-
tion (SD) of these variables per typology of executive. Normality of distributions is checked 
with skewness and kurtosis coefficients. A logarithmic transformation is performed, when nec-
essary, to obtain a normal distribution and apply correctly statistical analyses. The descriptive 
statistics are also represented with bar charts with average values of variables on y-axis and ty-
pology of executive on x-axis.  
The main statistical analysis of this study compares the arithmetic means of key variables be-
tween specific executives by applying the Independent Samples T Test: this parametric test 
compares the means of two independent groups (e.g., Monarchy/Parliamentary Monarchy vs. 
Mixed Executive) in order to determine whether the associated population means of variables 
among these sets of countries are significantly different. The null hypothesis (H0) and alterna-
tive hypothesis (H1) of the independent samples T test here are given by: 
 
H0: µ1 = µ2 (i.e., arithmetic mean of Monarchy/Parliamentary Monarchy is equal to 
Mixed Executives) 
H1: µ1  µ2 (i.e., arithmetic mean of Monarchy/Parliamentary Monarchy is NOT equal to 
Mixed Executives) 
 
This technique is a simple and reliable test to see whether statistical evidence supports 
the hypothesis α that nations governed by leadership-oriented executives (e.g., Parliamentary 
Monarchy and Monarchy) have higher technological and economic performances than countries 
with Mixed executives (a not leadership-oriented executive), ceteris paribus. Statistical anal-
yses are performed by means of the Statistics Software SPSS version 15.0. 
 
4. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
This section endeavours to substantiate the hypothesis α underlying the model of Figure 1. 
This study, as said above, hypothesizes that nations with a leadership-oriented executive, e.g., 
Monarchy and Parliamentary Monarchy, have levels of socioeconomic and technological per-
formances higher than Mixed Executives over time. Results of the descriptive statistics per ty-
pology of executive are in table 1.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables per typology of executive  
 
Classification 
of executive 
GDP  
per capita U$ 
Human 
Development  
Index 2002 
Kaufmann 
Political  
Stability 2006 
Energy 
Consumption 
Kg per Capita 
Electric 
power  
production 
(KWh) 
per Capita 
Parliamentary 
Monarchy 
Mean $11,055.52 0.83 0.597 3,434.97 16,121.58 
SD $9,808.20 0.13 0.829 3,432.64 30,614.85 
Monarchy 
       
Mean $7,374.17 0.71 0.336 5,973.11 6,985.32 
SD $5,512.96 0.13 0.721 7,912.94 12,226.46 
       
Mixed 
Executive 
Mean $5,757.65 0.68 0.189 1,523.56 5,531.86 
SD $6,668.25 0.18 0.975 2,198.42 12,007.55 
Note: SD is Standard Deviation 
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Figure 2. Average GDP per capita in U$ per typology of executive 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average index of Human Development per typology of executive 
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Figure 4. Average energy consumption (kg per capita) per typology of executive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Average electric power production (in kwh per capita) per typology of executive 
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Figure 6. Average Kaufmann political stability 2006 per typology of executive 
 
 
 
Figures 2-5 show that nations with parliamentary monarchy/monarchy have higher average 
levels of GDP per capita, HDI, and proxies of technological and economic performances.  
One of the contributing factors that explains these results can be due to higher political sta-
bility of monarchy and parliamentary monarchy than mixed executive (cf. Tab. 1 and Fig. 6).  
A logarithmic transformation is performed on some indicators to have normality of distribu-
tion and apply correctly further statistical analyses. Table 2 shows that the p-value of Test for 
Equality of Means (equal variances not assumed) is p < 0.05. In particular, considering this 
test, there is a significant difference at 5% in arithmetic mean performance of human develop-
ment index (HDI), GDP per capita, electric power production and energy consumption per capi-
ta between countries with parliamentary monarchy/monarchy and mixed executive. 
In short, results here seem to show that countries with leadership-oriented executives (e.g., 
Parliamentary Monarchy and Monarchy) have a significant (statistically) higher average levels 
of economic and technological performance than countries with Mixed executive.  
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Table 2. Independent Samples Test  
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of Variances 
T-test for Equality of Means 
LN GDP per capita PPP annual      
Parliamentary 
Monarchy and 
Mixed executive 
Equal variances 
assumed 
25.024 0.00 17.727 2614 0.00 
 Equal variances not assumed 18.572 1651.818 0.00 
Mixed executive 
and Monarchy 
Equal variances 
assumed 
23.605 0.00 7.219 2133 0.00 
 Equal variances not assumed 8.152 454.784 0.00 
Human development index 2002 F Sig. T df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Parliamentary 
Monarchy and 
Mixed executive 
Equal variances 
assumed 
195.576 0.00 21.14 3052.00 0.00 
 Equal variances not assumed 24.62 2225.60 0.00 
Mixed executive 
and Monarchy 
Equal variances 
assumed 
58.702 0.00 2.82 2555 0.005 
 Equal variances not assumed 3.58 619.999 0.00 
LN Kaufmann political stability 2006      
Parliamentary 
Monarchy and 
Mixed executive 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2.742 0.102 2.162 68 0.034 
 Equal variances not assumed 2.321 66.361 0.023 
Mixed executive 
and Monarchy 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2.887 0.096 1.418 48 0.163 
 Equal variances not assumed 2.219 14.699 0.043 
LN Energy consumption in kg per capita      
Parliamentary 
Monarchy and 
Mixed executive 
Equal variances 
assumed 
30.271 0.00 11.958 1458 0.00 
 Equal variances not assumed 13.031 848.020 0.00 
Mixed executive 
and Monarchy 
Equal variances 
assumed 
12.916 0.00 6.854 1230 0.00 
 Equal variances not assumed 5.965 204.485 0.00 
LN Electric power production (KWh) per capita     
Parliamentary 
Monarchy and 
Mixed executive 
Equal variances 
assumed 
13.783 0.00 14.722 2533 0.00 
 Equal variances not assumed 15.351 1402.081 0.00 
Mixed executive 
and Monarchy 
Equal variances 
assumed 
17.344 0.00 6.058 2135 0.00 
 Equal variances not assumed 6.707 458.473 0.00 
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Figure 7. Empirical results of the linkage between Monarchy and Parliamentary Monarchy Ex-
ecutive and higher average levels of technological and economic performances, ceteris paribus  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Empirical results of the linkage between Mixed executive and lower average levels of 
technological and economic performances, ceteris paribus  
 
 
 
Hence, parliamentary monarchy/monarchy nations seem to have average levels of socioeco-
nomic and technological performances higher than countries with mixed executive. These re-
sults are consistent with the hypothesis α stated above about the possible (positive) effect of 
leadership-oriented executives on technological and economic performances of nations, ceteris 
paribus. This result can be due to some systematic factors of nations, such as the higher political 
and economic stability of nations with a structure of executive based on parliamentary monar-
chy and monarchy (see Tabb. 1-2; Fig. 6).  
These findings, based on statistical evidence, are synthesized in the figure 7 and 8. This 
study now moves on to discuss the results, trying, as far as possible, to clarify the relation be-
tween leadership-oriented executive and socioeconomic - technological performances of na-
tions.  
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Figure 10. Percolation of leadership by specific structures of executive that support higher 
levels of technological and economic performances of nations, ceteris paribus  
 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Understanding the determinants of innovation is a key goal of the economics of technologi-
cal change to explain dissimilar technological and economic performances of nations. One of 
the main problems in this research field is how the structure of executive affects national level 
of innovative activities.  
The study here can provide a conceptual integration of the VOC and Spencer et al. (2005) 
theoretical framework arguing that some typologies of structure of executive, leadership-
oriented, can influence (positively) innovative activities of countries (fig. 10).  
Specifically, statistical evidence above seems in general to support the hypothesis α stated in 
the methodology that higher average levels of GDP per capita, energy consumption and electric 
power production per capita (proxy of economic and technological performances) of nations can 
be also explained by specific leadership-oriented executives, e.g. Monarchy and Parliamentary 
Monarchy, which induce a higher political stability over the long run, ceteris paribus (cf., Gua-
rini and Pattaro, 2016). Vice versa, countries based on mixed executives can have a weak lead-
ership in the structure of government that generate a political instability and, as a consequence, 
lower levels of economic and technological performances.  
As debate surrounds the adequacy of the VOC theory of innovation and Spencer et al. (2005) 
theoretical framework, the study's findings here suggest that the structure of government of 
countries may be a critical factor to explain some differences of innovative activities.  
In short, a clear and stronger leadership in executives of countries seems to be a main factor 
for supporting political stability and higher technological and socioeconomic performances over 
time. Broberg et al. (2013, p. 2574) argue that: “national political institutions typified by strong 
state authority and corporatist societies were found to create higher levels of applied innovative 
activity”. Ryan and Tipu (2013, p. 2116) show that: “active leadership has a strong and signifi-
cant positive effect on innovation propensity, while passive-avoidant leadership has a signifi-
cant but weakly positive effect on innovation propensity” (cf., Fernandez et al., 2008).  
One of the contributing factors of this positive relation between parliamentary monar-
chy/monarchy and higher levels of economic and technological performance can be due to 
longer political stability of countries with leadership-oriented executives. In fact, political stabil-
ity has a positive effect on economic growth and other socioeconomic activities (cf., Hussain 
Tabassam et al., 2016).  
This study provides some contributions to the socioeconomic literature on these topics, such 
as: 
(1) A conceptual integration of VOC and Spencer et al. (2005) theoretical framework by 
considering a new theoretical linkage between typologies of executive and a broader set of in-
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novative and economic performances of countries (e.g., GDP per capita, energy consumption 
and electric power production per capita). 
(2) The conceptual framework here assigns a central role to the executive leadership-
oriented, which is a factor neglected by certain of the dominant approaches to clarify contrib-
uting factors of higher levels of innovative activities and differences of technological – socioec-
onomic performances of nations; 
(3) The conceptual framework here seems in general to show that specific types of executive, 
e.g. Monarchy and Parliamentary Monarchy established by Constitution and law, support a clear 
leadership of government that induces longer political stability, higher wealth and innovative 
activities over the long run;  
This conceptual framework seems to be consilient (Thagard, 1988, Chp. 5), since it explains 
a greater number of socio-economic facts concerning higher technological performances of na-
tions. Moreover, the simple elements of the study here are well known in economic and social 
sciences. The idea that leadership is associated to fruitful technological performance is not new 
and already used in social and political sciences (Jung et al., 2008; Krause, 2004). However, the 
idea that leadership-oriented executives may be one of contributing factors that influences the 
political stability has not been used in literature to explain the different patterns of technological 
and economic performance across nations over time.  
The characteristic of analogy of the results here is well-established in many studies of man-
agement and industrial organization (cf., Makri and Scandura, 2010; Carmeli et al., 2010; Nel-
son, 1999;). 
In short, the typology of executive can help to explain differences between-countries innova-
tive performances and can be a main factor to be considered in VOC and Spencer et al. (2005) 
theories. Perhaps the most interesting finding of this study is that Monarchy and Parliamentary 
Monarchy, rather than Mixed Executive support longer political stability, higher innovative ac-
tivities and fruitful historical developmental paths.  
However, the current study here is exploratory in nature and examines only a limited number 
of variables. Moreover, the findings are contest-dependent because the geo-political structure of 
countries can change over time and space. Although this study offers important contributions to 
knowledge in these research fields, the study's findings need to be considered in light of their 
limitations. In fact, countries within the same political regime and type of executive have a high 
heterogeneity due to structural differences in political, cultural and social system that affect the 
technological and economic performances. Hence, some results discussed here should be con-
sidered with great caution because they are based on aggregate data of different countries with 
the same typology of executive. To exploring the general implications of this study, future re-
search should also consider some controls and intervening variables that may be useful in 
providing a deeper and richer explanation of these phenomena of interests (e.g., institutional 
contexts, electoral systems, level of democratization, etc.). Future efforts could also examine 
other technometrics that more closely related to innovative activities. 
Overall, then, the results of this study are of course tentative, since we know that other things 
are often not equal over time and space. In particular, more fine-grained studies will be useful in 
future, ones that can more easily examine other complex factors of socioeconomic systems that 
explain the dissimilar economic performance within and outside the same political regime and 
type of executive. Much work remains to understand the complex relations between executive 
of nations, their internal and external leadership and technological - socioeconomic performance 
to provide additional explanatory elements for a comprehensive VOC and Spencer et al. (2005) 
theory. To conclude, most of the focus here is on some typologies of executives and variables, 
clearly important, but not sufficient for broader understanding of how political - institutional 
structures affect national level of innovative activity of several nations over the long run.  
  
 
Working Paper IRCrES 1/2017 
 
 16 
 
6. APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1A: Countries with Type of Executive in 2003 
 
Monarchy Parliamentary Monarchy 
Country Region Country Region 
Bahrain Middle East Andorra Western Europe 
Bhutan Asia-Pacific Antigua & Barbuda South America 
Brunei Darussalam Asia-Pacific Australia Asia-Pacific 
Jordan Middle East Bahamas South America 
Kuwait Middle East Barbados South America 
Monaco Western Europe Belgium Western Europe 
Morocco Middle East Belize South America 
Nepal Asia-Pacific Cambodia Asia-Pacific 
Oman Middle East Canada North America 
Qatar Middle East Denmark Scandinavia 
Saudi Arabia Middle East Grenada South America 
Swaziland Africa Jamaica South America 
Tonga Asia-Pacific Japan Asia-Pacific 
  Lesotho Africa 
  Liechtenstein Western Europe 
  Luxembourg Western Europe 
  Malaysia Asia-Pacific 
  Netherlands Western Europe 
  New Zealand Asia-Pacific 
  Norway Scandinavia 
  Papua New Guinea Asia-Pacific 
  Samoa Asia-Pacific 
  Solomon Islands Asia-Pacific 
  Spain Western Europe 
  St. Kitts & Nevis South America 
  St. Lucia South America 
  St. Vincent & Grenadine South America 
  Sweden Scandinavia 
  Thailand Asia-Pacific 
  Tuvalu Asia-Pacific 
  United Kingdom Western Europe 
 
Note: Mixed Executives are not reported due to the long list of countries. Other types of executive, e.g. 
Presidential Republic, are not considered because data are misleading.  
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